Historically, the UK defence ecosystem has been characterised by its fragmented nature, with disconnected national players, separate government departments, and slow procurement processes that can stifle innovation and delay the delivery of new capabilities. This landscape can prevent the industry from adapting at the speed required to meet contemporary threats, hindering the very modernisation it needs.

While British systems are built on long-term, multi-year contracts and established bureaucracy, Ukraine's sector has been forged in the fire of direct combat. Ukrainian firms and innovators, from startups to established companies, are developing and deploying battle-tested technology, including advanced drones and autonomous systems, as well as new electronic warfare capabilities, on a timescale of weeks, not years. By not fully integrating with this dynamic environment, the UK risks not only missing out on the most impactful advancements but also losing a critical opportunity to learn how to build a more agile and effective industrial base.

This paper presents the case for a deeper, long-term partnership between the UK and Ukrainian defence ecosystems, enabling each nation to address the critical challenges it faces today. The UK could rapidly accelerate the adoption of cutting-edge technologies required to meet its mission-critical defence goals, while allowing Ukraine access to the commercial opportunities it desperately needs to put defence at the heart of its post-war recovery.

I would like to extend my gratitude to the contributors to this research paper, including individuals from investment funds, Ukrainian technology companies, the UK government, and the private UK defence industry. Their insights have proven invaluable in understanding how we can not only strengthen commercial ties between the UK and Ukrainian defence sectors beyond the end of the war in Ukraine, but also provide actionable next steps to help restructure how defence ecosystems in the UK and across Europe collaborate and remain agile.

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The UK Government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) (Ministry of Defence, 2025) marked a landmark shift in the UK’s approach to defence: a move to warfighting readiness in direct response to the new era of threat the country faces from global powers like russia and China. It serves as an acknowledgement of a new threat landscape more unpredictable than at any time since the Cold War, as well as the rapidly evolving nature of modern warfare that must now be adapted to.

Underpinned by a significant increase in defence spending, the SDR outlines a comprehensive plan to prepare the UK for potential high-intensity, state-on-state conflict. It’s a major repositioning that goes far beyond the armed forces alone and,
instead, calls for a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to advance a collective effort for increased national security. It places technology and innovation at the very heart of the UK’s future defence strategy, framing innovation as a core capability essential for maintaining a military advantage in an era of rapid technological change. To foster this innovative ecosystem, the SDR emphasises collaboration with startups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that can develop new technologies at pace.

We spoke to several other key players in the UK defence industry, who agreed that the SDR served as a good guide for success, setting out an ambitious idea of what the UK needs to achieve its defence goals. Jeremy Wimble, Defence Programme Manager at TechUK, a non-profit organisation, said, “TechUK was broadly positive about the SDR.
There were a number of commitments to address the foundational challenges the Ministry of Defence faces with the modern threat landscape, and getting to grips with these is absolutely crucial.”

Wimble cites the changes to the Office for Spectrum Management as a key example of the foundational shifts outlined in the SDR. These changes grant the Ministry of Defence (MoD) greater control over its radio spectrum, enabling private companies to use it for testing and development, therefore facilitating more effective partnerships with the private sector.

The clear intention of the SDR is a crucial first step that should not be understated. Many experts, however, expressed concern that the review did not provide complete clarity on how the UK would achieve its defence goals in practice. Sam Burrell, Partner at Expeditions, an early-stage dual-use investment firm focused on defence and security, called attention to recommendations for the procurement of innovative technologies, for instance. “The £400 million fund for innovative companies is not nearly enough - it should be £2 billion. And the ‘rapid commercial exploitation’ target of contracting within three months is too vague. It’s unclear what falls into that category.”

The UK's procurement process is a major bottleneck, particularly for SMEs. The system is characterised by rigid rules and a risk-averse culture that favours large prime contractors. One expert cited the culture of ‘no one was ever fired for giving a contract to a prime’ as a key sticking point for evolution in this space, preventing the MoD from accessing novel technologies developed by agile startups.

“Classic Western defence procurement involves multimillion-pound tenders offered to the
defence Primes to develop products over the course of multiple years,” described Sam Hood, an independent early-stage investor and former Partner at Black Sea Associates, a London-based international intelligence, research, defence, and security consulting firm. “Long lead times and project delays have historically led to the end product being out of date or not fit for the environment in which it is expected to operate. For example, the Watchkeeper drone platform achieved full operational capacity for the British Armed Forces in 2018, 18 years after the initial programme started.”

Despite being “in favour of much of what the SDR recommended”, Matthew Wright, Head of Delian UK, a builder of autonomous systems that combines robotics and sensors with in-house autonomy software, which raised a $14 million Series A in July, noted that “there was not enough emphasis on how it would be implemented. It seems the MoD has, on the surface, said it would accept the changes that need to be made, but in reality, it has not actually made them yet.”

Other experts we consulted for this paper highlighted foundational issues and logistical gaps that are undermining the entire system. They pointed to a lack of a clear enterprise architecture within the MoD, leading to a poor understanding of existing assets, their functions, and obsolescence. This lack of oversight makes it difficult to secure supply chains, which are often fragmented with small manufacturers contributing to major projects. Without a proper understanding of its own infrastructure and supply network, the UK cannot ensure a consistent and secure supply of materials in the event of a sustained conflict.

The challenge is not starting from zero, but scaling mass, tempo, and sustainment for high-intensity operations. Experts highlighted three key conversion gaps: the procurement cycle time, end-to-end supply chain visibility, and predictable pathways for SME adoption. Closing these within 12–24 months is the difference between pilot success and force-wide advantage. We posed a pertinent question: Is the UK currently prepared for a future conflict, wherever that may come from?

“In short, no”, said Sam Burrell (Expeditions), who is also a Royal Marines veteran. “The UK still has world-class capabilities in intelligence, nuclear deterrence, and special forces, but its conventional armed forces have been hollowed out by years of underinvestment. We could probably go back to fighting counterinsurgency campaigns fairly easily, but a conflict involving an adversary like Russia would require mass and sustained logistical capacity, which we don’t have.”

The numbers support this picture. Burrell points out that Russia's armed forces number 1.3 million personnel, not including reserves (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2025), while the UK's total personnel, including reserves, is only 181,890 (Ministry of Defence, 2025).

Among those agreeing that the UK is not yet scaled for sustained, high-intensity conflict was Matthew Wright (Delian Alliance Industries). Another expert explained that many NATO countries lack even basic early warning systems for detecting an air attack as it enters the country. He said, “I see that people don't truly grasp that something like that could happen to them. If, for example, tomorrow there were 500 terror targets above London, they would have no capacity to protect the city. People think they're not close enough to Russia for it to be a real threat.”

It’s the evolving nature of modern warfare that calls for a complete overhaul, not alteration, of the UK defence ecosystem, from battlefield tactics to supply chain resilience to procurement systems. Simply scaling up production of existing equipment and technologies or increasing funding without material systemic change will leave us vulnerable to these new challenges. Ultimately, while the SDR provides a bold vision for the future, experts believe that a lack of concrete funding, a procurement system built for low-tempo acquisition and logistical gaps mean that there is still more to be done before the UK can truly claim to be on a war-fighting footing.

When russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it was widely acknowledged that Ukraine’s military was simply not prepared for an attack of that magnitude. Despite years of military reform aimed at improving and modernising its forces following the 2014 conflict, Kyiv’s forces were still significantly outmatched in terms of scale and equipment for a multi-front war. After three years of brutal fighting, the war has become one of the deadliest conflicts in Europe since World War II, with civilian casualties alone reaching at least 13,883 by August 2025 (UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 2025).

Ukraine’s allies have watched as the conflict demonstrates, in real-time, the vulnerability of a ‘business as usual’ approach to defence and national resilience. It has laid bare the need for a fundamental shift in how modern defence capabilities are developed, procured and deployed, forcing a reevaluation of long-standing assumptions about the nature of contemporary warfare.

Serhii Skoryk, Commercial Director at Kvertus, a Ukrainian leader in electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and a member of the TechExchange cohort, has seen firsthand how the battlefield has changed. Russia’s initial strikes against Ukraine targeted radars, leaving the country “blind” in the first months of the invasion; a fate that he does not want the UK to share, should the instance arise. New technologies, such as unmanned sea drones, require new defence capabilities. Skoryk continued to say, “Unmanned naval vehicles have already proven they can penetrate traditional defences. If such a drone targeted a British ship, current measures — even drones — might not be able to stop it. These asymmetric tools change the calculus of maritime defence.”

Viktoriia Kulchytska, CCO of L7 Simulators, a Ukrainian producer of weapon simulation systems that provides both in-house hardware and software solutions and a member of the TechExchange cohort, echoes this sentiment. She shares that Ukrainian DefenceTech has been “tested, refined, and proven under live combat conditions, where failure is not an option”. Innovators are creating systems that are battle-validated, evolve fast, and, crucially, are built for resilience.

Reports from those on the frontline suggest that drones are now responsible for 70-80% of daily combat losses for both Ukraine and russia, and are also now the leading cause of death for civilians in Ukraine (United Nations, 2025). It’s an alarming statistic that underscores a fundamental shift in military strategy, where low-cost, expendable aerial platforms are not only effective for surveillance and reconnaissance but are also a primary means of inflicting casualties on both soldiers and civilians. The daily threat Ukraine has faced from drone attacks offers a critical lesson to the UK: that future conflicts may be dominated by readily available and technologically advanced systems that bypass traditional defences. The threat is one that we’re simply unprepared to face.

However, conflict in Ukraine has exposed more than just the weaknesses in Western nations’ defences against their adversaries. It has also acted as a powerful, real-world model of what a ‘whole-of society’ approach to national resilience can look like and its effectiveness in deterring future aggression.

Over the course of the war, Ukraine has fundamentally transformed its armed forces, leveraging rapid innovation and agility to forge a new defence order. Despite the huge disparity in resources, its inventive response has allowed it to achieve what many once thought impossible.

In his introduction to the SDR, Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer stated that“we must reco
gnise the very nature of warfare is being transformed on the battlefields of Ukraine and adapt our armed forces and our industry to lead this innovation” (Ministry of Defence, 2025). Throughout the rest of the 144-page review, there are consistent references to “drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine” and how “whoever gets new technology into the hands of their Armed Forces the quickest will win.”

Sam Hood (an independent early-stage investor) said, “Perhaps one of the largest military practices that Ukraine has changed is the development and procurement of defence technology. Ukraine has shown the defence industry that innovation and swiftly producing innovative products at scale can make the biggest impact on the battlefield.”

What has made Ukraine’s defence transformation so remarkable is its drive to respond directly to new threats on the battlefield as they emerge. “They have successfully turned the battlefield into perhaps the largest real-world R&D platform in the history of warfare,”remarked Hood. “The Ukrainian SMEs with whom we have worked will develop and field a
product in as little as one month. [It has demonstrated] the importance of end-user data, i.e. the experiences of the frontline troops. This has been critical for providing the correct solutions to problems faced on the battlefield.”

European defence leaders have singled out the shift from multi-year, multi-million-pound tenders to developing and deploying a field product in as little as a month as one of the most critical elements of success in the new defence landscape. TechUK’s Jeremy Wimble agrees that “the critical lessons are in terms of rapid test and evaluation, accelerating the T&E process, particularly for smaller businesses. The UKDI [UK Defence Innovation organisation] will have a much greater focus on achieving this.”

Sam Burrell (Expeditions) added that programmes like Operation Kindred are already allowing the UK to gain valuable knowledge from Ukraine. This is a dedicated task force for providing military aid to Ukraine by carefully managing and donating equipment from British military stockpiles. “[Because of this initiative], we now have teams on the ground there and a good understanding of the challenges in the Ukrainian operating environment,” Burrell said.

Despite the UK government’s acknowledgement that we must ‘learn from Ukraine’ and the opportunities to access Ukrainian operations through current aid, the experts we spoke to for this paper questioned the strength of the UK’s strategy to incorporate these lessons.

One commented, “There was no information or strategic input that we have to collaborate more closely with Ukraine and integrate Ukraine's defence industry into the UK's. It was just mentioned that the current war showed us a lot, and we've learned a lot, but there's no strategic input from Ukraine.”

Ukraine may be seen by many as the new blueprint for European defence, but the SDR makes no reference to a formal partnership between the UK and Ukraine to harness these capabilities. It raises questions about how much the UK can truly learn from Ukraine if this disconnect between the two defence ecosystems is maintained. The proposals from the SDR centre around strengthening the procurement of homegrown defence technologies from a deeper and broader pool of potential suppliers. Yet, one industry player questioned how a defence technology company not present in Ukraine could possibly know how to respond to the requirements of modern warfare.

“If you're an innovative defence tech company and you're not present in Ukraine, you have no idea what you're doing. You're just guessing. That's it, it's simple,” he said. “That's why it seems extremely strange to me when a Western-based startup attracts Western venture capital, a Western Ministry of Defence procures the final product, and we have this closed circle with no interaction with real life. It creates a vulnerability.”

The prevailing sentiment among Ukrainian innovators appears to be that the UK and other NATO countries should establish a direct link to the real-world battlefield to adequately prepare Western defence systems for the realities of modern warfare.

“It’s tempting to think that drone warfare, in the way that we see it on the Ukrainian front lines, is the future of all warfare,” said Sam Burrell (Expeditions). “It will certainly be a part of it, but the circumstances in Ukraine are unique. Neither side has air superiority, so there is effectively no air power deployed in the conflict. Now that both sides are low on artillery ammunition, they have turned to drones as a substitute.”

Another defence expert agreed that we must be careful not to transpose Ukraine’s very particular circumstances elsewhere: “Part of it is the geography; it’s a vast, open land mass. If you go 500 miles north to the Baltics, 52% of the land is forest. So, immediately, how effective are drones going to be there?” Others noted the impact that drones have had on the battlefield and whether we’re seeing them make a real, strategic difference, as opposed to just a tactical one. “If the consequence of all first-person-view (FPV) drones was that the conflict was over and they had pushed the Russians out, that's one thing. But that’s not the reality,” one individual commented.

“You have over 1,000 different companies supplying [the armed forces], which makes it incredibly difficult to scale in a structured and organised way.” Another industry expert noted that Ukraine's fragmented innovation and procurement systems highlight the importance of the UK's SDR in creating a more coherent approach to innovation. Beyond the logistical challenges to closer collaboration, contributors also cited several other sticking points: Ukraine's use of Chinese components in its defence technology, perceived governmental corruption, and the unpredictable nature of the country's post-war reconstruction.

This uncertainty proves particularly challenging when it comes to the private investment that could lay the foundation for future cooperation. “Investors want to see an exit strategy,” says Sam Hood (independent early-stage investor). “These are questions often not relevant to the Ukrainian firms, which, rightly so, are busy literally fighting for their lives, but you have to consider this from the perspective of the private investor. There is often no clear plan for the long-term post-war future of these firms.”

The unique nature of the conflict in Ukraine justifies the UK's development of its own distinct military strategy rather than merely replicating Ukraine’s. Nevertheless, a new era of threats is already impacting daily life across Europe, as evidenced by the significant increase in incidents involving drones and other aircraft, widely suspected to be Russian, flying over European countries.

It seems inevitable that the UK would implement some of the learnings from Ukraine, according to Matthew Wright (Delian Alliance Industries), who believes that “A wartime footing would see the UK adopt some of Ukraine’s approach to rapid procurement and testing, ripping up bureaucratic barriers that inhibit rapid adaptation.”

Given Ukraine's unparalleled insight into the future threat landscape, a crucial question arises: Is simply 'taking lessons' from Ukraine sufficient to deter these evolving threats? “Without that understanding of the threat, it would be difficult to modernise our defence strategies,” described Sam Burrell (Expeditions). “The positives of focusing on
homegrown technologies include greater sovereignty over critical capabilities, stronger supply chain security, and the ability to tailor systems to national needs. The negatives include the fact that the UK’s scale is limited compared to the US or EU, meaning costs per programme are high.

Most importantly, access to global innovation is important, and prioritising homegrown technologies can sometimes overlook this.” Others point out that using Ukrainian insight to inform UK innovation may only result in the same technology being produced, but at a much slower pace and with significant funds wasted on repeat R&D. Our research suggests that the solution is not to choose one over the other, but to create a system that leverages both.

On the UK side, there is still valuable work to be done to improve the procurement of technologies from our world-leading deeptech ecosystem. Matthew Wright (Delian Alliance Industries) said, “Ukraine has shown what is possible when it comes to rapid adaptation of commercial hardware, and how fast defence procurement can move when needed. I believe the combination of AI and commercial hardware that constantly iterates is here to stay.”

Another expert described how the MoD is considering the use of formalised collaboration between SMEs themselves streamline the procurement processes. SMEs could operate effectively as clusters or what some may refer to as ‘defence rap-hacks’, where this group would share the administrative burden and bid collectively for MoD contracts.

However, defence industry players stress the importance of getting the fundamentals right before commencing a full-scale technology procurement drive. They placed particular emphasis on culture within the MoD and ensuring it is a good customer to SMEs by reforming complex and bureaucratic processes. In an extreme example, one contributor noted instances of companies going out of business while waiting for an MoD contract to materialise due to notoriously long procurement cycles.

They also cited the importance of supply chain resilience in the current environment. Sebastian Bassett-James, Special Advisor at the Defence Security and Resilience Bank and Chairman of the Milkwood Group, argued,
“We should establish a comprehensive system for mapping, monitoring, and auditing the supply chains of all defence and resilience-related equipment and services. This must include infrastructure and public service components, not just front-line defence assets. Such a system should provide transparency on interdependencies, ownership structures, and vulnerabilities, including hostile control of critical nodes.”

These are just a few examples of changes that can be made to improve the adoption and deployment of game-changing defence technologies in the domestic sphere. However, we cannot afford to forget about Ukrainian innovators in the drive to restructure the UK defence ecosystem.

The war has ravaged many of Ukraine’s key industries, including the agricultural sector, which, prior to the war, accounted for 41% of Ukraine’s total exports (International Trade Administration, 2023) and employment for 14% of the population (US Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, 2022).

It is absolutely vital that Ukraine is given the opportunity to leverage its world-class defence industry as a source of economic recovery post-conflict. One expert describes the challenge of moving the UK away from an approach where Ukraine shares its knowledge but lacks the opportunity to integrate it into a joint production or development process. Ukraine’s defence technologies are battle-proven and world-leading, but without robust intellectual property (IP) strategies, Ukraine risks losing ownership and long-term economic benefit. It’s an issue that requires more than just goodwill, but new policies and laws to protect Ukraine from becoming an exporter of ideas alone.

Sebastian Bassett-James suggests a different approach. “We should create a structured programme for UK–Ukraine collaboration that offers companies joint security clearances, shared IP frameworks, standardised licensing, and introductions to manufacturing partners, insurers, and specialist funders. The process should be merit-based, with clearly defined milestones and performance standards, rather than favouring preferential treatment, ensuring that only the most promising solutions progress. This would dramatically lower barriers for SMEs while maintaining quality assurance.”

Other defence industry experts we spoke to agreed that, in the current geopolitical climate, it would be extremely beneficial for the UK to show leadership by establishing a new programme for investing in Ukrainian defence technology. By developing a strong joint ecosystem, we move away from money flowing from the UK to Ukraine and towards a mutually beneficial partnership that has the appropriate guardrails to be sustainable and scalable. Appropriate guardrails include a live, formal system for monitoring supplier networks to support export controls and procurement rules, suggested Sebastian Bassett-James. “This should track relationships between suppliers and entities of concern or those associated with hostile-state actors,” he described. “Continuous monitoring, rather than periodic reviews, will be key to maintaining trust while enabling exports and innovation partnerships.”

Bassett-James also recommends that these reforms be supported by greater engagement with insurers and trusted, specialist funders who have expertise in defence and security. He said, “The insurance industry, particularly Lloyd’s and similar global players, has both a financial interest and deep analytical capability to bring to this field. Similarly, private funders with defence backgrounds are well-positioned to understand unique industry risks, derisk investment in Ukrainian innovation, and back complex ventures.”

Private investment routes continue to play a key role in the evolution of the UK defence ecosystem. While there’s an appetite for investment, one expert described how most venture capitalists are not yet ready to put this appetite into action, with the overall level of awareness of international investment opportunities remaining quite low. “One of the main problems is that they don’t get support from the UK government,” one expert remarked.

“They don't receive a "green light" from the government that investing in Ukrainian defence tech is okay and will be supported politically or otherwise.” This individual often finds himself in conversations with investors, wondering if there is a government programme in place to communicate their position on investing in Ukrainian technologies.

“Rather than treating investment in Ukrainian tech as an external venture activity, trusted banks, funds, and insurers should be directly engaged as part of the security, resilience, and defence ecosystem,” argued Sebastian Bassett-James (Special Advisor to the Defence Security and Resilience Bank and Chairman of the Milkwood Group). “Providing these institutions with security clearance mechanisms would allow them to act as genuine partners rather than cautious observers. This builds confidence and strengthens ties between the UK’s private capital markets and Ukraine’s innovation ecosystem.” We see that private investment to begin building the foundations of collaboration with Ukraine would be a win-win situation. Ukraine's defence tech companies get an opportunity to grow, and the UK gains access to their technology and knowledge without relying solely on taxpayer money.

The UK defence industry is in the midst of a historic transformation, but Ukrainian innovators seeking to commercialise their post-war defence technologies face a different timeline. They cannot afford to wait. If Ukrainian defence technology companies don’t begin planning their expansion into the UK now, they risk losing both their hard-earned innovation to outside players creating the same technology, as well as a vital opportunity to enter an evolving market. Therefore, proactive steps must be taken to establish a foothold in a rapidly evolving sector.

Of course, we will also be awaiting crucial changes in the Ukrainian defence industry, namely, the lifting of the export ban. It’s essential that this ban be lifted before the war ends for two primary reasons: First, it would enable Ukrainian companies and startups to establish international relationships while still operating within Ukraine. Second, the financial revenue generated by exports could provide crucial funding for the industry's sustained growth and development, effectively leveraging commercial activity to support military readiness.

As a first piece of advice, our defence experts emphasised the importance of understanding just how complex the task ahead for Ukraine’s defence innovators will be. From previous experience working with Ukrainian companies as they seek to enter the UK market, one expert emphasised how even the simplest things can act as a major obstacle, such as opening a UK bank account. “It’s very difficult for them to participate in the procurement process,” he explained. “The standard answer is, 'just go to the website,' but when you look deeper, you find that you need to have a UK-based entity, and some part of your product has to be made with UK components, and so on.”

This long-standing preference for homegrown technologies is a significant hurdle. However, our contributors suggest there are ways for Ukrainian companies to minimise their ‘outsider’ status by proactively building key connections as they enter the UK market.

Sebastian Bassett-James (Special Advisor to the Defence Security and Resilience Bank and Chairman of the Milkwood Group) suggests that early compliance with UK and NATO standards and processes should be a priority. “Demonstrating ISO, Cyber Essentials Plus, and NATO procurement standards upfront will be critical.” He also emphasised the importance of high visibility in UK trade networks and events, such as techUK, DSEI and the Integrated Systems Europe, to establish credibility. Finally, Bassett-James recommends that “Packaging real-world performance data into polished case studies will differentiate Ukrainian firms, ready to engage British organisations.”

Others point to the power of dual-use capabilities and the need to look beyond the Ukrainian battlefield as early as possible. “Some of the Ukrainian ISR drone companies are dual-use in their nature,” described Sam Burrell (Expeditions). “Skyeton, for example, existed before the war and did a lot of business developing drones for agriculture up until 2022. Ukrainian secure communications technologies can also be dual-use – HIMERA is a good example of a company in this space. And of course, Ukrainian cybersecurity has always been strong.” Burrell explains how tools for secure communications, encryption and network resilience have been scaled rapidly out of wartime necessity, but could easily be used commercially in finance or enterprise IT.”

A recurring piece of advice, shared by nearly every key player we interviewed for this paper, was the critical importance of visibility within the UK. “Spend time in the UK. Open a UK subsidiary. Set out a clear route to market in the UK, and a plan for post-war restructuring,” said Sam Burrell. Sam Hood (independent early-stage investor) agreed that Ukrainian firms that have already attracted investment tend to have capabilities outside of Ukraine, usually through manufacturing sites or technology development. “To private investors, this can be a signal that these firms are willing to explore new markets and operate in new jurisdictions.” Sam Hood provided further context on what form these capabilities could take beyond Ukraine. “Rather than being seen as attempting to sell into the UK market from abroad, three recommendations I offer through my own experience include:

1) Branch out of Ukraine: Set up an office and conduct work in the UK – this was one of the first things I accomplished when leading my Ukrainian-founded defence tech startup. Ukrainian startups have unique offerings, and you must allow for the skills and ‘lessons learned’ to be applied to a different, more commercial problem set
2) Establish a UK network and partnerships. The clichéd saying ‘your network is your net worth’ is cringy, but true. Ukrainian startups need to be present and face-to-face with the UK market in order to develop trust. Partnering with existing UK entities is also a great way to develop trust through a recognised and established UK accelerator programme and business associations.
3) ‘Naturalise’ your business in the UK; Working and setting up an office in the UK is a start, but marketing your services towards the UK helps to develop trust. Even simple things, such as a UK-registered phone number, can go a long way in presenting to prospective clients that your presence in the UK is long-term. Additionally, hiring UK staff helps to provide local expertise from both a business and relationship-building perspective.”

Other contributors agreed that true joint ventures between UK corporations and Ukrainian innovators will be the key to effective collaboration between the two nations. Where the UK offers future access to markets and commercial opportunities, the Ukrainian side brings the knowledge and expertise to address international security challenges as they exist today and in the future. This could include joint Research and Development, with access to essential laboratory space, manufacturing facilities. This way, the UK isn’t just absorbing information from Ukraine, but engaging in a real exchange of capabilities.

The war in Ukraine has exposed both the fragility of Western defence structures and the extraordinary power of battlefield-driven innovation. For the UK, the SDR is an important step, but without systemic reform and meaningful integration with Ukraine’s defence ecosystem, it risks repeating old mistakes: slow procurement, siloed innovation and missed opportunities for resilience.

Ukraine offers not just lessons, but a live blueprint. Its innovators have shown that (in a wartime setting) defence technology can be conceived, tested and deployed in weeks rather than years. If the UK is serious about achieving warfighting readiness and rebuilding its defence industrial base, it must now embed those lessons structurally, through new frameworks, investment models, and partnerships.

1. Establish a UK-Ukraine Defence Innovation Pathway: joint accreditation, shared IP frameworks and fast-track procurement for battle-tested technologies.
2. Reform procurement: extend “rapid commercial exploitation” beyond pilots. Create SME clusters to reduce administrative burdens. Impose service-level standards (contract decisions within 90 days, for example).
3. Map and secure supply chains: Introduce a national system to monitor vulnerabilities and dependencies, including hostile ownership of critical nodes.
4. Signal investor confidence: Publish clear guidance that investing in Ukrainian defence technology is politically supported and strategically aligned with UK policy.

The UK cannot afford to treat Ukraine’s defence transformation as a distant case study. It must be a partner, not a spectator. By embedding Ukrainian innovation into the UK defence ecosystem, it can modernise at the speed of relevance, strengthen NATO resilience and ensure that Ukraine’s recovery is built on the success of its own industry. The UK has a prime opportunity to lead the charge on a joint UK-Ukraine defence innovation ecosystem; now it must seize it.